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"When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know 
something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, 
your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of 
knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science." 




Every decade or two, food becomes newsworthy globally. Mostly it is about a price spike, 
either upwards (hurting consumers, as in 1973 and 2008) or downwards (hurting farmers in 
open economies, as in 1986). And most such price spikes are a consequence of major policy 
shifts, since local weather-induced supply shocks in a many-country trading world tend to 
offset each other. In 1986, for example, it was the food export subsidy war between Western 
Europe and North America that drove real international food prices to their lowest level since 
1930. The price hikes of 1973 and 2008, by contrast, were partly a consequence of a 
unilateral policy decisions by a single large player. In 1973, the Soviet Union departed from 
its policy of self-reliance and entered the international grain market in a significant way to 
offset a domestic shortfall. In 2008 the United States and European Union decided to 
subsidize biofuel production and set mandates/targets for its use domestically. On both 
occasions, other governments imposed export restrictions to insulate somewhat their 
consumers from the price rise, which pushed international prices even higher and drove more 
exporting countries to follow suit. Policy thus contributes to market volatility. That is 
undesirable because volatility around the long-run trend terms of trade slows economic 
growth (Williamson 2008). Yet trade policy measures are very blunt instruments for dealing   3 
with volatility (especially in the modern era of myriad financial instruments for risk 
management), and their beggar-thy-neighbor feature diminishes the international public good 
contribution of trade openness. 
  Less newsworthy to the mass media, but probably far more important in its effect on 
the long-run growth and distribution of global welfare, are gradual policy developments in 
individual countries and their combined effect on other countries via the trend terms of trade 
in international markets.
1
For advanced economies the most common reason for farm trade restrictions in the 
past two centuries has been to protect domestic producers from import competition as they 
come under competitive pressure to shed labor in the course of economic development. But 
in the process those protective measures hurt not only domestic consumers and exporters of 
other products but also foreign producers and traders of farm products, and they reduce 
national and global economic welfare. For decades agricultural protection and subsidies in 
high-income (and some middle-income) countries have been depressing international prices 
of farm products, which lowers the earnings of farmers and associated rural businesses in 
developing countries. The Haberler (1958) report to GATT Contracting Parties forewarned 
 This study is about one such set of trade-related policy 
developments that, over the past half century, has had dramatic effects – in some ways 
negative, in others positive – on distortions to agricultural incentives and thus also consumer 
prices for food. Given the importance of farm and food prices for the world’s poor, those 
policy-imposed distortions not only affect economic growth but also income inequality and 
poverty.  
The benefits from specialization in production and exchange have been recognized for 
millennia, yet governments have chosen to restrict international trade, including in 
agricultural goods. Sometimes it would be via export taxes, to raise government revenue or to 
lower the price of food for domestic consumers. An early example was the tax on wine 
exports from Greece in the first century BC and from France and Germany in the dark ages 
(Johnson 1989). More commonly it took the form of import duties or bans, often as part of a 
broader foreign policy, as with Britain’s imports of wine from France versus Portugal and 
Spain in the 1700s and 1800s (Nye 2007). The practice was so striking that wine was used as 
the example of British imports in the first treatise on the theory of comparative advantage 
(Ricardo 1817).  
                                                 
1 Some of the more transformational policy developments happen quite promptly, such as the end of 
colonization  around 1960; the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy in Europe in 1962; the floating of 
exchange rates and associated liberalization, deregualtion, privatization and democratization in the mid-1980s; 
the opening of China from 1979; and the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991   4 
that such distortions might worsen, and indeed they did between the 1950s and the early 
1980s (Anderson, Hayami and Others 1986), thereby adding to global inequality and poverty 
because three-quarters of the world’s poorest people depend directly or indirectly on 
agriculture for their main income (World Bank 2007).
2
During the past quarter century, however, numerous countries have begun to reform 
their agricultural price and trade policies. That has raised the extent to which farm products 
are traded internationally (see Appendix Table 1.A), but not nearly as fast as globalization 
has proceeded in the non-farm sectors of the world’s economies.
  
But in addition to this external policy influence on rural poverty, the governments of 
many developing countries have directly taxed their farmers over the past half-century. A 
well-known example is the taxing of exports of plantation crops in post-colonial Africa 
(Bates 1981). At the same time, many developing countries chose also to pursue an import-
substituting industrialization strategy, predominantly by restricting imports of manufactures, 
and to overvalue their currency. Together those measures indirectly taxed producers of other 
tradable products in developing economies, by far the most numerous of them being farmers 
(Krueger, Schiff and Valdés 1988, 1991). Thus the price incentives facing farmers in many 
developing countries have been depressed by both own-country and other countries’ 
agricultural price and international trade policies. 
This disarray in world agriculture, as D. Gale Johnson (1991) described it in the title 
of his seminal book, means there has been over-production of farm products in high-income 
countries and under-production in more-needy developing countries. It also means there has 
been less international trade in farm products than would be the case under free trade, thereby 
thinning markets for these weather-dependent products and thus making them more volatile. 
Using a stochastic model of world food markets, Tyers and Anderson (1992, Table 6.14) 
found that instability of international food prices in the early 1980s was three times greater 
than it would have been under free trade in those products.  
3
                                                 
2 According to the FAOSTAT (
 A key purpose of the 
present study is to examine empirically the extent to which those reforms have reversed the 
above-mentioned policy developments of the previous three decades. True, empirical 
www.fao.org), currently less than 15 million relatively wealthy farmers in 
developed countries, with an average of almost 80 hectares per worker, are being helped at the expense of not 
only consumers and taxpayers in those rich countries but also the majority of the 1.3 billion relatively 
impoverished farmers and their large families in developing countries who, on average, have to earn a living 
from just 2.5 hectares per worker. 
3 In the two decades to 2000-04, the value of global exports as a share of GDP rose from 19 to 26 percent, even 
though most of GDP is nontradable governmental and other services (World Bank 2007, as summarized in 
Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson 2007).   5 
indicators of farm sector support (called Producer Support Estimates or PSEs) have been 
provided in a consistent way for 20 years by the Secretariat of the OECD (2008a) for its 30 
member countries. However, there are no comprehensive time series rates of assistance to 
producers of nonagricultural goods to compare with the PSEs, nor do they tell us what 
happened in those advanced economies in earlier decades – which are of more immediate 
relevance if we are to see how the two groups of countries’ policies developed during similar 
stages of development. As for developing countries, almost no comparable time series 
estimates have been generated since the Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988) study, which 
covered the 1960-1985 period for just 17 developing countries.
4
These estimates can be helpful, and are in numerous chapters below, in addressing 
such questions as the following: Where is there still a policy bias against agricultural 
production? To what extent has there been overshooting in the sense that some developing-
country food producers are now being protected from import competition along the lines of 
the examples of earlier-industrializing Europe and Japan? What are the political economy 
forces behind the more-successful reformers, and how do they compare with those in less-
successful countries where major distortions in agricultural incentives remain? Over the past 
two decades, how important have domestic political forces been in bringing about reform 
relative to international forces (such as loan conditionality, rounds of multilateral trade 
negotiations within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, regional integration 
agreements, accession to the World Trade Organization, and the globalization of 
supermarkets and other firms along the value chain) and compared with forces operating in 
 An exception is a new set of 
estimates of nominal rates of protection for key farm products in China, India, Indonesia and 
Vietnam since 1985 (Orden et al. 2007). The OECD (2006) also has released PSEs for Brazil, 
China and South Africa as well as several more East European countries. The present study 
complements and extends those two institutions’ efforts and the seminal Krueger, Schiff and 
Valdés (1988) study. It builds on them by providing similar estimates for other significant 
(including many low-income) developing economies, by developing and estimating new, 
more comprehensive policy indicators, and by employing the calculated price wedges in a 
global economy wide model to estimate the effects of recent and prospective policy 
developments.  
                                                 
4 A nine-year update for the Latin American countries in the Krueger, Schiff and Valdés sample by the same 
country authors, and a comparable study of seven central and eastern European countries, contain estimates at 
least of direct agricultural distortions (see Valdés 1996, 2000). The Krueger, Schiff and Valdés (1991) chapters 
on Ghana and Sri Lanka have protection estimates back to 1955, as does the study by Anderson, Hayami and 
Others (1986) for Korea and Taiwan (and Japan, and much earlier in the case of rice).    6 
earlier decades? What explains the pattern of distortions across industries and the choice of 
support or tax instruments within the agricultural sector of each country? What policy lessons 
and market implications may be drawn from these differing experiences with a view to 
ensuring better growth-enhancing and poverty-reducing outcomes—including less 
overshooting that results in protectionist regimes—in still-distorted economies during their 
reforms in the future? 
  The study is timely for at least three reasons. One is because the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) is in the midst of the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations, and 
agricultural policy reform is one of the most contentious issues in those talks. Indeed 
economy-wide modeling has suggested that as much as two-thirds of the global welfare gains 
from removing all merchandise trade restrictions and agricultural subsidies would come from 
reform of agricultural policies, even though agriculture accounts for less than 8 percent of 
world GDP and exports (Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 2006). Second, poorer 
countries and their development partners are striving to achieve their United Nations–
encouraged Millennium Development Goals by 2015, the prime ones being the alleviation of 
hunger and poverty. And third, the outputs of the study are timely also because world food 
prices have spiked in 2008 at very high levels and governments in some developing 
countries, in their panic to deal with the inevitable protests from consumers, have reacted in 
far from optimal ways. Such spikes have occurred in the past, most notably in 1973-74, and 
lessons as to what policy responses work better than others can be drawn from such past 
experiences.  
The present study includes 75 countries that together account for 92 percent of the 
world’s population and agricultural GDP and 95 percent of total GDP. The sample countries 
also account for more than 85 percent of farm production and employment in each of Africa, 
Asia, Latin America and the transition economies of Europe and Central Asia, and their 
spectrum of per capita incomes ranges from the poorest (Zimbabwe and Ethiopia) to among 
the richest (Norway).
5
                                                 
5 See Appendix B. The only countries not well represented in the sample are those in the Middle East and the 
many small ones, but in total the omitted countries account for less than 5 percent of the global economy. 
 Nominal rates of assistance and consumer tax equivalents (NRAs and 
CTEs) are estimated for more than 70 different products, with an average of almost a dozen 
per country. In aggregate the coverage represents around 70 percent of the gross value of 
agricultural production in the focus countries, and just under two-thirds of global farm 
production valued at undistorted prices over the period covered. Not all countries had data for   7 
the entire 1955-2007 period, but the average number of years covered is 41 per country.
6
                                                 
6 By way of comparison, the seminal multi-country study of agricultural pricing policy by Krueger, Schiff and 
Valdes (1991) covered an average of 23 years to the mid-1980s for its 18 focus countries that accounted for 5-6 
percent of the global agricultural output; and the producer and consumer support estimates of the OECD (2008a) 
cover 22 years for its 30 countries that account for just over one-quarter of the world’s agricultural output 
valued at undistorted prices. 
 Of 
the world’s 30 most valuable agricultural products, the NRAs cover 77 percent of global 
output, ranging from two-thirds for livestock, three-quarters for oilseeds and tropical crops, 
and five-sixths for grains and tubers. Those products represent an even higher share (85 
percent) of global agricultural exports (see Appendix B for details). 
Having such a comprehensive coverage of countries, products and years offers the 
prospect of obtaining a reliable picture of both long-term trends in policies, and annual 
fluctuations around those trends, for individual countries and commodities as well as for 
country groups, regions, and the world as a whole. The results can also serve as inputs into 
explanations of why government policies evolved as they did, and can thereby contribute to 
policy dialogues because, as Stigler (1975, p. ix) wrote, “Until we understand why our society 
adopts its policies, we will be poorly equipped to give useful advice on how to change those 
policies”.  
This chapter begins with a brief summary of the long history of national distortions to 
agricultural markets. It then outlines the methodology used to generate annual indicators of 
the extent of government interventions in markets, details of which are provided in Anderson 
et al. (2008a,b) and Appendix A. A description of the economies under study and their 
economic growth and structural changes over recent decades is then briefly presented as a 
preface to the main section of the chapter, in which the NRA and CTE estimates are 
summarized across regions and over the decades since the 1950s. These estimates are 
discussed in far more detail in the regional chapters that follow. A summary is also provided 
of an additional set of indicators of agricultural price distortions presented in Chapter 11 that 
are based on the trade restrictiveness index first developed by Anderson and Neary (2005). In 
Chapter 12 the focus shifts from countries to commodities, and all the various distortion 
indicators are used to provide a sense of how distorted are each of the key farm commodity 
markets globally. Then chapter 13 uses the study’s NRA and CTE estimates to provide a new 
set of results from a global economy-wide model that attempts to quantify the impacts on 
global markets, net farm incomes and welfare of the reforms since the early 1980s and of the 
policies still in place as of 2004. The chapter concludes by drawing on the lessons learned to 
speculate on the prospects for further reducing the disarray in world agricultural markets.    8 
 
 
National Distortions to Farmer Incentives: The Long History, Briefly  
 
 
While much government intervention in agricultural trade over the centuries has been aimed 
at stabilizing domestic food prices and supplies, there has been a general tendency for poor 
agrarian economies to tax agriculture relative to other sectors. Then as nations industrialized, 
their policy regimes have tended to gradually change from negatively to positively assisting 
farmers relative to other producers (and from subsidizing to taxing food consumers).  
Consider Britain, the first country to have an industrial revolution. Prior to that 
revolution – from the late 1100s to the 1660s – Britain used export taxes and licenses to 
prevent domestic food prices from rising excessively. But during 1660-90 a series of Acts 
gradually raised food import duties (making imports prohibitive under most circumstances) 
and reduced export restrictions on grain. These provisions that were made even more 
protective of British farmers by the Corn Laws of 1815. The famous repeal of the Corn Laws 
in the mid-1840s is often said to have heralded a period of relatively unrestricted food trade 
for Britain, although even then protection was retained for another generation for breweries 
and distilleries – and hence grain producers – via restrictions on imports of wine and spirits. 
According to Nye (2007), it was only after the passage of the 1860 Anglo-French Treaty of 
Commerce that Britain moved closer to freer trade than France, and that other European 
countries began to open up. But then agricultural protection returned in the 1930s and 
steadily increased over the next five decades. Indeed on the Continent the period of freer 
trade in the 19
th century was quite short for some countries, and agricultural protection levels 
in those countries throughout the 20
th
Kindleberger (1975) describes how the nineteenth century free trade movements in 
Europe reflected the national economic, political and sociological conditions of the time. 
Agricultural trade reform was less difficult for countries such as Britain with overseas 
territories that could provide the metropole with a ready supply of farm products. The fall in 
the price of grain imports from America in the 1870s and 1880s provided a challenge for all, 
however. Denmark coped well by moving more into livestock production to take advantage 
of cheaper grain. Italians coped by sending many of their relatives to the New World. 
 century were somewhat higher on average than in 
Britain.    9 
Farmers in France and Germany successfully sought protection from imports, however, and 
so began the post-industrial-revolution growth of agricultural protectionism in densely 
populated countries. Meanwhile, tariffs on West European imports of manufactures were 
progressively reduced after the GATT came into force in the late 1940s, thereby adding to the 
encouragement of agricultural relative to manufacturing production. (Lindert 1991; Anderson 
1995).  
Japan provides an even more striking example of the tendency to switch from taxing 
to increasingly assisting agriculture relative to other industries. Its industrialization began 
later than in Europe, after the opening up of the economy following the Meiji Restoration in 
1868. By 1900 Japan had switched from being a small net exporter of food to becoming 
increasingly dependent on imports of rice (its main staple food and responsible for more than 
half the value of domestic food production). This was followed by calls from farmers and 
their supporters for rice import controls. Their calls were matched by equally vigorous calls 
from manufacturing and commercial groups for unrestricted food trade, since the price of rice 
at that time was a major determinant of real wages in the nonfarm sector. The heated debates 
were not unlike those that led to the repeal of the Corn Laws in Britain six decades earlier. In 
Japan, however, the forces of protection triumphed, and a tariff was imposed on rice imports 
from 1904. That tariff then gradually rose over time, raising the domestic price of rice to 
more than 30 per cent above the import price during World War I. Even when there were 
food riots because of shortages and high rice prices just after that war, the Japanese 
government's response was not to reduce protection but instead to extend it to its colonies and 
to shift from a national to an imperial rice self-sufficiency policy. That involved accelerated 
investments in agricultural development in the colonies of Korea and Taiwan behind an ever-
higher external tariff wall that by the latter 1930s had driven imperial rice prices to more than 
60 per cent above those in international markets (Anderson and Tyers 1992). After the Pacific 
War ended and Japan lost its colonies, its agricultural protection growth resumed and spread 
from rice to an ever-wider range of farm products. 
The other high-income countries were settled by Europeans relatively recently and are 
far less-densely populated. They therefore have had a strong comparative advantage in farm 
products for most of their history following Caucasian settlement, and so have felt less need 
to protect their farmers than Europe or Northeast Asia. Indeed Australia and New Zealand 
until the present decade have tended – like developing countries – to have adopted policies 
that discriminated against their farmers (Anderson, Lloyd and MacLaren 2007).    10 
  In South Korea and Taiwan in the 1950s, as in many newly independent developing 
countries, an import-substituting industrialization strategy was initially adopted, which 
harmed agriculture. But in those two economies – unlike in most other developing countries – 
that policy was replaced in the early 1960s with a more-neutral trade policy that resulted in 
their very rapid export-oriented industrialization. That development strategy in those densely 
populated economies imposed competitive pressure on the farm sector which, just as in Japan 
in earlier decades, prompted farmers to lobby (successfully, as it happened) for ever-higher 
levels of protection from import protection (Anderson, Hayami and Others 1986, Ch. 2). 
Many less-advanced and less-rapidly growing developing countries not only adopted 
import-substituting industrialization strategies in the late 1950s/early 1960s (Little Scitovsky 
and Scott 1970; Balassa and Associates 1971) but also imposed direct taxes on their exports 
of farm products. It was common in the 1950s and 1960s and in some cases through to the 
1980s also to use dual or multiple exchange rates so as to indirectly tax both exporters and 
importers (Bhagwati 1978, Krueger 1978). This added to the anti-trade bias of developing 
countries’ trade policies. Certainly within the agricultural sector of each country, import-
competing industries tended to enjoy more government support than those that were more 
competitive internationally (Krueger, Schiff and Valdés 1988; Herrmann et al. 1992; Thiele 
2004). The Krueger et al. study also reveals that, at least up to the mid-1980s, direct 
disincentives for farmers such as agricultural export taxes were less important than indirect 
disincentives in the form of import protection for the manufacturing sector or overvalued 
exchange rates, both of which attracted resources away from agricultural industries producing 
tradable products. 
In short, historically countries have tended to gradually change from taxing to 
subsidizing agriculture increasingly relative to other sectors in the course of their economic 
development although less so, and at a later stage of development, the stronger a country’s 
comparative advantage in agriculture (Anderson, Hayami and Others 1986; Lindert 1991). 
Hence at any point in time farmers in poor countries tended to face depressed terms of trade 
relative to product prices in international markets, while the opposite was true for farmers in 
rich countries (Anderson 1995). Again the exceptions were rich countries with an extreme 
comparative advantage in agriculture (Australia, New Zealand). 
While that policy history of developing countries is now well known, and has been 
documented extensively in previous surveys, less well-known is the extent to which many 
emerging economies have belatedly followed the example of South Korea and Taiwan in 
abandoning import-substitution and opening their economies. Some (e.g., Chile) started in the   11 
1970s while others (e.g., India) did not do so in a sustained way until the 1990s. Some have 
adopted a very gradual pace of reform, with occasional reversals, while others have moved 
rapidly to open markets. And some have adopted the rhetoric of reform but in practice have 
done little to free up their economies. To get a clear sense of the overall impact of these 
reform attempts, there is no substitute for empirical analysis that quantifies over time the 
nature and degree of market intervention by governments.  
 
 
Methodology for Measuring Price Distortions
7
Specifically, we compute the Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) for each farm 
product as the percentage by which government policies have raised gross returns to farmers 
above what they would be without the government’s intervention (or lowered them, if 
NRA<0). We include any product-specific input subsidies in that NRA. A weighted average 
NRA for all covered products is derived using the value of production at undistorted prices as 
weights (unlike the producer and consumer support estimates (PSEs and CSEs) computed by 
OECD (2008a) which are expressed as a percentage of the distorted price). To that NRA for 
covered products is added a ‘guesstimate’ of the NRA for non-covered products (on average 
around 30 pecent of the total) and an estimate of the NRA from non-product-specific forms 
of assistance or taxation. Since the 1980s some high-income governments have also provided 
so-called ‘decoupled’ assistance to farmers but, because that support in principle does not 
distort resource allocation, its NRA has been computed separately and is not included for 




The main focus of the present study’s methodology is on government-imposed distortions 
that create a gap between domestic prices and what they would be under free markets. Since 
it is not possible to understand the characteristics of agricultural development with a sectoral 
view alone, the project not only estimates the effects of direct agricultural policy measures 
(including distortions in the foreign exchange market), but it also generates estimates of 
distortions in non-agricultural sectors for comparative evaluation.  
8
                                                 
7 Only a brief summary of the methodology is provided here. For details see Anderson et al. (2008a,b) or 
Appendix A. 
 Each farm 
8 The extent to which a payment is production-neutral (the degree of decoupling) differs depending on the way it 
is administered and the expectations of the recipient (Thompson, Dewbre and Martini 2007). No attempt here is 
made to evaluate the extent of the distortion that might still be present as policies are decoupled from output   12 
industry is classified either as import-competing, or a producer of exportables, or as 
producing a nontradable (with its status sometimes changing over the years), so as to generate 
for each year the weighted average NRAs for the two different groups of covered tradable 
farm products. We also generate a production-weighted average NRA for nonagricultural 
tradables, for comparison with that for agricultural tradables via the calculation of a 







t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the 
agricultural (including non-covered) and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.
9 Since the 
NRA cannot be less than -100 percent if producers are to earn anything, neither can the RRA 
(since the weighted average NRAnonag
t
This approach is not well suited to analysis of the policies of Europe’s or Asia’s 
former socialist economies prior to their reform era, because prices then played only an 
accounting function and currency exchange rates were enormously distorted. During their 
reform era, however, the price comparison approach provides as valuable a set of indicators 
for them as for other market economies of distortions to incentives for farm production, 
consumption and trade, and of the income transfers associated with interventions.
 is non-negative in all our country case studies). And 
if both of those sectors are equally assisted, the RRA is zero. This measure is useful in that if 
it is below (above) zero, it provides an internationally comparable indication of the extent to 
which a country’s sectoral policy regime has an anti- (pro-)agricultural bias.  
10
In addition to the mean NRA, a measure of the dispersion or variability of the NRA 
estimates across the covered farm products also is generated for each economy. The cost of 
government policy distortions to incentives in terms of resource misallocation tend to be 
greater the greater the degree of substitution in production. In the case of agriculture which 
involves the use of farm land that is sector-specific but transferable among farm activities, the 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
price and quantity produced. Rather, we include as ‘decoupled’ the value the OECD estimates under certain 
categories of support. For the years 1979-85 there was just one category, called ‘direct payments’; from 1986, 
those payments are specified to comprise the OECD’s items C (payments based on area planted/animal 
numbers), D (payments based on historical entitlements), F (payments based on input constraints) and G 
(payments based on overall farming income); and for 2005-07, those items replaced by similar but newly 
defined items C to E. This categorization for economic purposes (and that for ‘non-product-specific’ assistance) 
should not be confused with the legal allocation of domestic support measures into the WTO colored “boxes” in 
the context of international commitments. 
9 Farmers are affected not just by prices of their own products but also by the incentives nonagricultural 
producers face. That is, it is relative prices and hence relative rates of government assistance that affect 
producer incentives. More than seventy years ago Lerner (1936) provided his Symmetry Theorem that proved 
that in a two-sector economy, an import tax has the same effect as an export tax. This carries over to a model 
that also includes a third sector producing only nontradables. 
10 Data availability also affects the year from which NRAs can be computed. For Europe’s transition economies 
that starting date is 1992, for Vietnam it is 1986 and for China it is 1981.   13 
greater the variation of NRAs across industries within the sector then the higher will be the 
welfare cost of those market interventions. A simple indicator of dispersion is the standard 
deviation of the covered industries’ NRAs.  
  While most of the focus is on agricultural producers, we also consider the extent to 
which consumers are taxed or subsidized. To do so, we calculate a Consumer Tax Equivalent 
(CTE) by comparing the price that consumers pay for their food and the international price of 
each food product at the border. Differences between the NRA and the CTE arise from 
distortions in the domestic economy that are caused by transfer policies and taxes/subsidies 
that cause the prices paid by consumers (adjusted to the farmgate level) to differ from those 
received by producers. In the absence of any other information, the CTE for each tradable 
farm product is assumed to be the same as the NRA from border distortions and the CTE for 
nontradable farm products is assumed to be zero.  
To obtain dollar values of farmer assistance and consumer taxation, we have taken the 
country authors’ NRA estimates and multiplied them by the gross value of production at 
undistorted prices to obtain an estimate in US dollars of the direct gross subsidy equivalent of 
assistance to farmers (GSE). These GSE values are calculated in constant dollars, and are also 
expressed on per-farm-worker basis. Likewise a value of the consumer transfer is derived 
from the CTE, by assuming consumption value is the gross value of production at undistorted 
prices divided by the self-sufficiency ratio for each product (production divided by 
consumption, derived from national volume data or the FAO’s commodity balance sheets). 
These transfer values can be added up across products for a country, and across countries for 
any or all products, to get regional aggregate transfer estimates for the studied economies. 
Needless to say, there are numerous challenges in applying the above methodology, 
especially in less developed economies with poor-quality data. Ways to deal with the 
standard challenges are detailed in the second section of Appendix A, while country specific 
issues are discussed in the relevant chapters below. 
We turn now to summarizing the estimates that have emerged from aggregating the 
NRA and related estimates provided by the project’s country case studies,
11
                                                 
11 While the nest section summarizes the findings in subsequent chapters, readers should be aware that the 
emerging economy chapters in Part III of this book are themselves summaries of the findings in a large number 
of developing country case studies that are detailed in one of four companion volumes covering Africa 
(Anderson and Masters 2009), East and South Asia (Anderson and Martin 2009a), Latin America and the 
Caribbean (Anderson and Valdés 2008) and European and Central Asian transition economies (Anderson and 
Swinnen 2008). 
 prefacing that 
with a brief review of the relative size, economic growth and structural changes that have 
taken place in the key regions of the world over recent decades. After the national country   14 
studies were completed and the global database of NRA and CTE estimates was assembled 
(see Anderson and Valenzuela 2008), it was possible to estimate partial equilibrium country 
and global commodity indexes of the trade and welfare restrictiveness of agricultural policies. 
Since those estimates are not part of the country studies reported in Part II of the book, the 
methodology for them is not laid out until chapter 11, following which is a summary of those 
index estimates.  
 
 
Empirical Estimates of National Distortions to Farmer Incentives 
 
 
For the purposes of the present study, the world economy is divided into high-income 
countries (Western Europe, the United States/Canada, Japan, and Australia/New Zealand),
12
  North America and Europe (including the newly acceded eastern members of the EU) 
each account for almost one-third of the global economy, and the remaining one-third is 
shared almost equally by developing countries and the other high-income countries. When 
the focus turns to just agriculture, however, developing countries are responsible for slightly 
over half the value added globally, with Asia accounting for two-thirds of that lion’s share. 
The developing countries’ majority becomes stronger still in terms of global population and 
even more so in terms of farmers, almost three-quarters of whom are in Asian developing 
countries. Hence the vast range of per capita incomes and agricultural land per capita, and 
thus agricultural comparative advantages, across the country groups in table 1.1, and the 
strong concentration of poor people in Asia. The number of poor in Asia has diminished 
dramatically over the past quarter century though, and even more as a percentage of Asia’s 
population (unlike in Africa), but 60 percent of the world’s population living on less than $1 
a day still lived in Asia in 2005 (down from 87 percent in 1981 and 76 percent in 1993 – see 
table 1.2). The decline in Asian poverty was associated with its much faster economic growth 
 
three developing country regions (Africa, Asia and Latin America), and Europe’s economies 
that were in transition from socialism in the 1990s plus Turkey. (Turkey is included in this 
last group because it is in the same geographic region and, like others in that region, has been 
seeking European Union accession which necessarily has influenced the evolution of its 
agricultural price and trade policies.)  
                                                 
12 Korea and Taiwan are are categorized here as ‘developing’ rather than high-income because at the beginning 
of the 50-year period under study they were among the poorest economies in the world.   15 
and export-led industrialization than the rest of the world’s: since 1980, Asia’s per capita 
GDP has grown at four times, and exports nearly two times, the global averages (table 1.3). 
The share of Asia’s GDP that is exported is now one-third above that for the rest of the world 
and for Latin America (as summarized from the World Bank (2007) by Sandri, Valenzuela 
and Anderson (2007)). 
By 2000-04 just 12 percent of Asia’s GDP came from agriculture on average. That 
contrasts with Africa where the share for our focus countries ranges from 20 to 40 percent, 
and with Latin America and Europe’s transition economies where it is down to 6 percent (and 
to just 2 percent on average in high-income countries). The share of employment in 
agriculture remains very high in Asia though, at just under 60 percent – which is the same as 
in Africa and three times the share in Latin America and Eastern Europe, although more 
farmers work part-time on their farms in Asia than in other developing countries. By contrast, 
less than 4 percent of workers in high-income countries are still engaged in agriculture. 
Hence the much greater importance to developing country welfare, inequality and poverty of 
own-country and rest-of-world distortions to agricultural incentives. 
 
Nominal rates of assistance and gross subsidy equivalent to agriculture  
 
Perhaps the simplest measure for capturing the aggregate extent of distortions to agricultural 
prices globally is to examine the trend in the gross subsidy equivalent of assistance (GSE, 
positive or negative) to farmers. Figure 1.1(a) shows the GSE for 5-yearly periods since 1960 
for the world as a whole, for developing countries, and for high-income plus Europe’s 
transition economies. The dark line suggests that, apart from the dip during the period of high 
world food prices in 1973-74, the GSE has been steadily rising over the past half century, 
especially when the decoupled assistance to farmers in high-income countries is included.
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The decomposition of those global transfers by country group in figure 1.1(a) reveals 
two distinct pairs of trends, each kinked part-way through the period. On the one hand, 
aggregate support for farmers in high-income countries rose steadily throughout the period 
from the 1950s to the early 1990s before declining slightly over the most recent 15 years and 
somewhat more at the end of the period when world food prices shot up. On the other hand, 
the price and trade policies of developing countries increasingly taxed their farmers in 
  
                                                 
13 The GSE estimates for 1955-59 are smaller for high-income countries but less negative for developing 
countries, so the aggregate effect is an empirical issue. Unfortunately our sample of developing countries for 
that period is too small to provide a reliable estimate of the net effect.   16 
aggregate from the early 1960s to the late 1970s/early 1980s before gradually reducing that 
taxation and, by the mid-1990s switching to positive assistance to them in aggregate. Thus 
the contributions of the two groups to the global trend are additive in the 1980s but then 
offsetting from the early 1990s to 2004. In the 2005-07 period when food prices in 
international markets rose steeply (and spiked even more in 2008), transfers to farmers in 
high-income countries fell back considerably (similar to what happened in 1973-74). We do 
not have enough estimates to show the change for developing countries, but their 
governments too have responded by reducing/suspending import tariffs and temporarily 
restricting export of food in 2007-08, so they may have contributed to, rather than offset, the 
high-income country downward trend in those most recent years. 
In figure 1.1(b) those contributions are further subdivided into four high-income 
regions and four other regions, from which is clear that Japan and Western Europe are the 
biggest contributors among the high-income countries and that Asia is the biggest contributor 
by far to the developing country trends – and in both sub-periods. As we will see, the latter 
result is very largely driven by China and India, although protection growth in Korea added 
to the assistance increase. 
The GSE, while it takes care of inflation by being expressed in constant dollar terms, 
does not take into account the fact that the agricultural sector is growing and at different rates 
across countries. That downside is avoided by using the nominal rate of assistance, which is 
the extent of policy induced price support expressed as a percentage of the value of 
agricultural output at undistorted prices. Figure 1.2 and Table 1.4, which show the same 8 
country groups as Figure 1.1(b), reveal much more similarity among the regions’ NRAs than 
the GSEs for the very different-sized developing country groups. They also reveal that Japan 
is now proportionately far more protective of its farmers than Western Europe. The bottom 
row of table 1.4 provides a similar trend to the GSE trend line: the global average NRA was 
close to zero up to the early 1980s, but it then jumped up as developing countries began to 
phase out export taxation and it has since averaged in the 15-18 percent range. 
Both of these figures are based not only on estimates of assistance to covered products 
but also non-product-specific assistance and guesstimates of assistance to the roughly 30 
percent of the value of farm products that have not been included in the study’s explicit price 
comparison exercise. Figure 1.3 summarizes just the most-robust NRA estimates, for covered 
farm products. Those products have been categorized each year as either exportable, import-
competing or nontradable. The weighted average trends across those covered products are   17 
very similar to the GSE trends both for high-income countries and, in slightly more muted 
fashion, for developing countries.  
What is more striking about figure 1.3 is the marked difference in the levels of 
support to import-competing versus exportable covered products. Exportables in high-income 
countries have received relatively little support other than during the export subsidy ‘war’ of 
the mid-1980s, while in developing countries they were increasingly taxed from the late 
1950s until the 1980s and then that taxation was gradually phased out over the past two 
decades (although a little remained in 2004, for example in Argentina, and considerably more 
was added by various developing countries in 2008 in response to concerns about the spike in 
international food prices). Importables, by contrast, have been assisted throughout the past 
five decades, and the long-run fitted trend line has almost the same slope for both sets of 
countries (but a lower intercept for developing countries). Two lessons can be drawn from 
this: first, there is a strong anti-trade bias for agricultural goods in high-income and 
developing countries that has not diminished much over the past half century (and it got a lot 
worse in the 1980s); and second, growth in agricultural import protection appears to have 
accompanied global economic growth through to the 1990s at least, and has only slowed 
slightly since then. These lessons hold even when we disaggregate to our 8 regions, as shown 
in table 1.5, which also reports estimates of a trade bias index for each region. That index 
confirms the broad global conclusion, although it does indicate a sizable decline in the anti-
trade bias in developing countries since the 1980s, especially in Asia.   
  That anti-trade bias means that the rates of assistance are not uniform across 
commodities, which indicates that the resources that are being used within the farm sector are 
not being put to their best use. The extent of that extra inefficiency, over and above that due 
to too many or too few resources in aggregate in the sector, is crudely indicated by the 
standard deviation of NRAs among covered products in each focus country. This dispersion 
index, summarized for our 8 regions in table 1.6, has fluctuated across time and varied 
between regions, but the global average has remained around 70 percent throughout the 
period, with no discernable trend.  
  The NRAs for different covered products are not random, because their weighted 
averages across developing or high-income countries cover a wide spectrum. Figure 1.4 
shows that rice, sugar and milk (the rice pudding ingredients) are by far the most assisted 
farm industries in both sets of countries, with beef and poultry meat next. Cotton has the next 
highest NRA in the high-income figure, but it has the lowest (most negative) NRA in 
developing countries.   18 
  When the country authors’ best guesstimates of the NRAs for the various non-covered 
farm products are aggregated across countries, their weighted average tends to be less than 
half that for covered products. This is not surprising since many of them are nontraded staples 
or fruits and vegetables that receive little or no government attention – and that is partly why 
they were not covered by authors in the first place. Their inclusion in the weighted average 
across all products therefore dampens the positive or negative NRA average for a region’s 
covered products. Non-product-specific (NPS)  and ‘decoupled’ assistance to farmers added 
only a little to the NRA for most developing countries, but NPS added 2 or 3 percentage 
points until  the early 1980s and has contributed about 5 points since then for high-income 
countries. If ‘decoupled’ payments were included, the NRA for high-income farmers would 
rise another 5 percentage points for the 1980s and early 1990s and as many as 10 points by 
during the present decade (table 1.7). 
 
Assistance to non-farm sectors and relative rates of assistance 
 
The anti-agricultural policy biases of the past were due not just to agricultural policies. Also 
important in developing countries, according to Krueger, Schiff and Valdés (1988), has been 
border protection to the manufacturing sector (which has been the dominant intervention in 
the tradables part of non-agricultural sectors). Unfortunately it has not been possible with the 
resources available for this study to quantifying the distortions to non-farm tradable sectors as 
carefully as for agriculture. Authors typically have had to rely on applied trade taxes (for 
exports as well as imports) rather than being able to undertake price comparisons, and hence 
they usually do not capture the quantitative restrictions on trade which were important in 
earlier decades but decreasingly so through recent times. Nor do they capture distortions in 
the services sectors, some of which now produce tradables (or would do in the absence of 
interventions preventing their emergence). As a result, the estimated NRAs for non-farm 
importables are smaller and decline less rapidly than in fact was the case – and likewise for 
non-farm exportables, except their NRAs in some cases would have been negative. Of those 
two elements of under-estimation, the former bias certainly dominates, so the authors’ 
estimate of the overall NRA for non-agricultural tradables should be considered as lower-
bound estimates, and more so in the past so that its decline is less rapid than it should be.
14
                                                 
14 As a reality check, compare this project’s regional NRAs for non-agricultural tradables for the 1960s with the 
spot-year national NRAs from manufacturing import protection (in brackets) for the eight countries reported in 
Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970) and Balassa and Associates (1971): South Asia 120 percent (Pakistan 96 
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Despite these methodological limitations, the estimated NRAs for non-farm tradables 
are very sizeable prior to the 1990s. For developing countries as a whole, the average NRA 
value has steadily declined throughout the past four or five decades, from around 45 percent 
in the 1960s to around 30 percent in the 1970s, 16 pecent in the 1980s and less than 10 
percent since the mid-1990s as policy reforms have spread (second last row of table 1.7). 
This has therefore contributed to a decline in the estimated negative relative rate of assistance 
for farmers: the weighted average RRA was worse than -50 percent up to the mid-1970s but 
improved to an average of -38 percent in the 1980s, -12 percent in the 1990s and just above 
zero (1 percent) in 2000-04. The trend in RRAs and their two component NRAs for 
developing countries is starkly illustrated in figure 1.5, where it is clear that the falling 
positive NRAs for non-farm producers has contributed even more to the rise of the RRA than 
has the gradual disappearance of the negative NRAs for farmers. When decomposed by 
region, it is clear that Asia has been the major contributor to this dramatic reform (figure 1.6 
and table 1.8). And within Asia, it is China and India that contributed most to that outcome 
(Anderson and Martin 2009b).  
The average changes in those indicators for high-income countries look minor by 
comparison with those for developing countries, although those weighted averages hide 
major differences across the high-income countries. Even figure 1.7 doesn’t do justice to the 
the striking examples of Australia and New Zealand where the phasing out of high 
manufacturing tariffs provided nearly as large a boost to farmer incentives as was enjoyed in 
the developing country group. There are two difference between those two farm-exporting 
countries and the average developing country, though. One is that much of the cut in 
Australia’s manufacturing protection occurred in the decade before 1955-59, when the RRA 
was far more negative (not shown in figure 1.7 but see Anderson et al. 2009); the other is that 
Australian and New Zealand farmers enjoyed considerable direct assistance for much of the 
time manufacturing was protected, and that farm assistance was cut at the same time as was 
manufacturing protection, which kept the RRA from rising greatly from the 1970s (table 1.8).  
Despite the very considerable policy reforms of the past quarter century, there is still a 
long way to go before differences in rates of assistance across countries are removed. The 
spread of NRAs and RRAs for all our focus countries is shown in figure 1.8 for 2000-04. As 
economic growth proceeds there are fewer countries below the zero lines in those ladders, 
reflecting the apparently on-going tendency for political economy forces to transform 
                                                                                                                                                        
percent), East Asia 40 percent (Malaysia 8 percent, Philippines 29-46 percent, Taiwan 30 percent), and Latin 
America 30 percent (Argentina 141 percent, Brazil 89-99 percent, Chlie 89 percent, Mexico 20-22 percent).    20 
countries from taxing to subsidizing their farmers relative to producers of non-farm goods as 
per capita incomes grow. For the whole panel dataset, that tendency over the 50-year period 
examined appears to be almost exactly the same for developing as for high-income countries, 
the only difference being the average RRA starting point (see the country fixed effects 
regression lines in figure 1.9).
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To conclude this survey, we return to the dollar values mentioned at the outset. Table 1.9 
shows their full time series, in aggregate but also per person engaged in agriculture. Two 
points are worth stressing from the latter estimates. One is that for high-income countries, 
when decoupled payments are included, the assistance per farmer has continued to rise over 
time even when expressed in constant (2000) US dollars. By 2000-04 the annual transfer was 
double what it was in 1975-79, and that in turn is more than double the transfer in 1965-69. 
At $13,400 per farmer that is a very large transfer to a group whose household incomes are 
not grossly below those of non-farm workers when adjusted for differences between urban 
   
A final way of summarizing two of the reform indicators used above – the RRA and 
the trade bias index, by which we are able to assess changes in the anti- or pro- agricultural 
production and trade biases in policy regimes – is to map them in two-dimensional space. 
Figure 1.10 shows agriculture’s trade bias index on the horizontal axis and the RRA on the 
vertical axis. An economy with no anti- or pro-agricultural bias (RRA = 0) and no anti- or 
pro-trade bias within the farm sector (TBI = 0) would be located at the intersection of the two 
axes in figure 1.10. Africa, Asia and Latin America (shown there as LAC) were all well to the 
southwest of that neutral point as of 1980-84, but by 2000-04 all had moved to become much 
closer to the vertical axis (meaning they had reduced their anti-trade bias in agriculture), and 
all but Africa had become closer to the horizontal axis – although Asia is now above rather 
than below that axis, which means those developing countries are assisting farmers relative to 
producers of other tradable products. While that can lead to just as much waste of resources 
as the earlier, anti-agricultural, policy bias, it is only in Korea and Taiwan that the 2000-04 
RRA is well above zero (being just 1 percent for China and 4 percent for Southeast Asia).   
 
Producer assistance and consumer taxation in value terms 
 
                                                 
15 The R
2 values improve (to 0.16 and 0.26, respectively) and the slope of each line steepens (coefficients 
become 0.36 and 0.32, respectively) if the years from 1990 for HICs and before 1985 for DCs are ignored.    21 
and rural costs of living.
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The indicators used above to summarize trends in the extent of distortions within the 
agricultural sector of a country include the unweighted or weighted mean NRA of covered 
products, the standard deviation of covered product NRAs, the weighted mean NRA for 
exportable versus import-competing covered products, and the trade bias index of the 
agricultural sectors’ covered plus non-covered tradable products. The reason for reporting 
 The second point to note from table 1.9(b) is that for half this 
period, farmers in developing countries were effectively taxed between 30 and 50 US cents a 
day by price-distorting policies, at a time when many hundreds of millions of them were 
struggling to survive on less than $1 a day per household member. Thankfully most of the 
export taxation that drove those transfers was dismantled, although some has been resurrected 
in response to the high international food prices of 2008. The move from negative to positive 
transfers to developing country farmers since the mid-1990s is not necessarily a good thing, 
however, even if society believes farmers should be compensated for the cost of adjusting to 
the structural changes that accompany rapid economic growth – there are almost always more 
efficient ways to raise welfare of poor people than via price and trade policies. 
  Since it is mostly border (trade) policies rather than domestic measures that are 
responsible for the nominal assistance provided to farmers, those border measures also confer 
a tax on consumers of farm products. The extent of those consumer tax equivalents, shown in 
table 1.10 for all covered farm products, differ from NRAs also because consumption weights 
are not the same as production weights for tradable products. But in percentage terms their 
orders of magnitude are similar to the NRAs. Again two points are noteworthy. One is that 
developing countries’ price-distorting policies prior to the 1990s had been providing up to 30 
cents per capita per year to consumers, directly at the expense of farmers who on average are 
far poorer than urban dwellers. The other is that the cost to consumers in high-income 
countries of farm support policies is miniscule relative to their incomes, amounting even at its 
peak in the most protected countries other than Japan to well under $1 a day. It is thus not 
surprising that domestic opposition to these policies is weak.  
 
 
Additional Indicators of Agricultural Price Distortions 
 
 
                                                 
16 The drop to $6,000 per farmer in 2005-07 may well prove to be only temporary if international food prices 
return to trend levels soon.   22 
these various indicators of dispersion of NRAs in addition to the means – apart from them 
being informative in their own right – is that theory suggests the national economic welfare 
cost of government policy distortions to incentives in terms of resource misallocation tends to 
be greater the greater the degree of substitution in production in response to price changes. In 
the case of agriculture which involves the use of farm land that is sector-specific but 
substitutable among farm activities, the greater the variation of NRAs across industries within 
the sector then the higher will be the welfare cost of those market interventions. 
While those various indicators of dispersion are useful, it would also be helpful to 
have a single indicator to capture the overall welfare or trade effect of each country’s regime 
of agricultural price distortions in place at any time, and to trace its path over time and make 
cross-country comparisons. To that end, Chapter 11 draws on a theoretical literature that has 
developed in recent years to provide such indicators for national price and trade policies that 
are well grounded in theory. They belong to the family of indexes first developed by 
Anderson and Neary (2005) under the catch-all name of trade restrictiveness indexes.   
Specifically, to capture distortions imposed by each country’s border and domestic 
policies on its economic welfare and its trade volume, Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009a) 
define a Welfare Reduction Index (WRI) and a Trade Reduction Index (TRI) and estimate 
them for the project’s focus countries since 1960, taking into account that for some covered 
products the NRA and CTE differ (because there are domestic measures in place in addition 
to or instead of trade measures). As their names suggest, these two new indexes respectively 
capture in a single indicator the (partial equilibrium) welfare- or trade-reducing effects of 
distortions to consumer and producer prices of covered farm products from all agricultural 
and food policy measures in place (while ignoring non-covered farm products and indirect 
effects of sectoral and trade policy measures directed at non-agricultural sectors). The WRI 
measure reflects the welfare cost of agricultural price-distorting policies better than the NRA 
or CTE because it recognizes that the welfare cost of a government-imposed price distortion 
is related to the square of the price wedge. It thus captures the disproportionately higher 
welfare costs of peak levels of assistance or taxation, and is larger than the mean and is 
positive regardless of whether the government’s agricultural policy is favoring or hurting 
farmers. Also, the WRI and TRI measures have the advantage of providing a theoretically 
sound indicator of the welfare (or trade) effect in a single sectoral measure that is comparable 
across time and place. In this way the WRI and TRI go somewhat closer to what a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) can provide in the way of estimates of the trade and 
welfare (and other) effects of the price distortions captured by the product NRA and CTE   23 
estimates, while having the advantage of providing an annual time series. The time series 
derived for this project, available as Anderson and Croser (2009), is made use of in Chapters 
11 and 12.  
  The WRI five-year results in Figure 1.11 indicate a fairly constant tendency for 
covered products’ policies to reduce welfare from the 1960s to the mid-1980s, but 
thereafter some decline in the 1990s. This pattern is generated by different policy regimes 
in the different country groups though: in high-income countries, covered products were 
assisted throughout the period, although less so after the 1980s, whereas covered products 
in developing countries were disprotected until the most recent years. That is, the WRI has 
the desirable property of correctly identifying the welfare consequences that result from 
both positive and negative assistance regimes, because it captures the dispersion of NRAs 
among covered products: the larger the variance in assistance levels, the greater the 
potential for resources to be used in activities which do not maximize economic welfare. 
One consequence is that the WRI values are much higher than the NRAs for high-income 
countries. Another consequence is that the WRI for Africa spikes in the mid-1980s in 
contrast to the NRA which moves close to zero. The reason is that while Africa was still 
taxing exportables it had moved (temporarily) from low to very high positive levels of 
protection for import-competing farm products (table 1.4). At the aggregate level African 
farmers received almost no government assistance then (NRA close to zero), but the 
welfare cost of its mixture of agricultural policies as a whole was at its highest according to 
the WRI. A third consequence is that for developing countries its average WRI in the years 
1995 to 2004 is around 20 percent even though its average NRA for covered products in 
those years is close to zero (see figure 1.3), again reflecting the high dispersion across 
product NRAs – particularly between exportables and import-competing goods – in each 
country.
17
  For developing countries as a group, the trade restrictiveness of agricultural policy 
was roughly constant until the early 1990s and thereafter it declined, especially for Asia 
and Latin America, according to the TRI estimates. For high-income countries the TRI time 
path was similar but the decline began a few years later. The aggregate results for 
developing countries are being driven by the exportables sub-sector which is being taxed 
 
                                                 
17 National WRIs are aggregated across countries using as weights an average of the value of consumption and 
production at undistorted prices; and TRIs use the absolute difference between the values of production and 
consumption at undistorted prices as weights. This is unlike NRAs and RRAs (or CTEs), which use as weights 
just the value at undistorted prices of production (or consumption). Like NRAs, RRAs and CTEs, national and 
regional WRIs and TRIs for the 5-year periods are unweighted averages of the annual indexes.   24 
and the import-competing sub-sector which is being protected (albeit by less than in high-
income countries). For high-income countries, policies have supported both exporting and 
import-competing agricultural products and, even though they favor the latter much more 
heavily, the assistance to exporters has offset somewhat the anti-trade bias from the 
protection of import-competing producers in terms of their impacts on those countries’ 
aggregate volume of trade in farm products. Thus up to the early 1990s the TRI for high-
income countries was below that for developing countries; and, to use again the example of 
Africa, in 1985-89 when the NRA was closest to zero the TRI peaked, correctly identifying 
the trade-reducing effect of positive protection to the import-competing farmers and 
disprotection to producers of exportables (Figure 11.6 and Table 11.4 of Lloyd, Croser and 
Anderson 2009a). 
  Chapter 12 differs from the preceding chapters in that it focuses on commodities 
rather than countries, to show by to what extent global markets for some farm commodities 
are distorted relative to others. It also shows that the basic food staples of the poor in low-
income countries are reasonably well covered in our database for African countries where 
they matter most, and that their non-coverage in other regions does not bias the aggregate 
NRA estimates for covered products. That chapter also reports new partial equilibrium 
estimates of global commodity TRIs and WRIs, to parallel the country-based ones reported 
in chapter 11. A summary of both of them for 28 key farm commodities is provided in 
figure 1.12 (from Lloyd, Croser and Anderson 2009b). It shows that the most distorted of 
all those commodities in 2000-04, in terms of both their global welfare cost and their trade 
restrictiveness, are rice, sugar, milk and beef – although cocoa trade is just as restricted as 
beef, because export restrictions are still prevalent in major supplying countries such as 
Cote d’Ivoire. 
   
 
Economy-Wide Effects of Past Reforms and Remaining Policies 
 
 
It is clear from the above that there has been a great deal of change over the past quarter of a 
century in policy distortions to agricultural incentives throughout the world: the anti-
agricultural and anti-trade biases of policies of many developing countries have been 
reduced, export subsidies of high-income countries have been cut, and some re-
instrumentation toward less inefficient and less trade-distorting forms of support, particularly   25 
in Western Europe, has begun. However, protection from agricultural import competition has 
continued to be on an upward trend in both rich and poor countries, notwithstanding the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture that aimed to bind and reduce farm tariffs.  
What, then, have been the net economic effects of agricultural price and trade policy 
changes around the world since the early 1980s? And how do those effects on global markets, 
farm incomes and economic welfare compare with the effects of price distortions still in place 
as of 2004? The final chapter by Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe and Anderson (2009) 
uses a global economy-wide model to provide a combined retrospective and prospective 
analysis that seeks to assess how far the world has come, and how far it still has to go, in 
removing the disarray in world agriculture. It quantifies the impacts both of past reforms and 
current policies by comparing the effects of the project’s NRA and CTE distortion estimates 
for the period 1980-84 with those of 2004.  
Several key findings from that economy-wide modeling study are worth emphasizing. 
First, the policy reforms from the ealy-1980s to the mid-2000s improved global economic 
welfare by $233 billion per year, and removing the distortions remaining as of 2004 would 
add another $168 billion per year. This suggests that in a global welfare sense the world had 
moved three-fifths of the way towards global free trade in goods over that quarter century. 
Second, developing economies benefited proportionately more than high-income 
economies (1.0 percent compared with 0.7 percent of national income) from those past policy 
reforms, and would gain nearly twice as much as high-income countries by completing that 
reform process (an average increase of 0.9 percent compared with 0.5 percent for high-
income countries. Of those prospective welfare gains from global liberalization, 60 percent 
would come from agriculture and food policy reform. This is a striking result given that the 
shares of agriculture and food in global GDP and global merchandise trade are only 3 and 6 
percent, respectively. The contribution of farm and food policy reform to the prospective 
welfare gain for just developing countries is even greater, at 83 percent.   26 
Third, the share of global farm production exported (excluding intra-EU trade) in 
2004 was slightly smaller as a result of those reforms since 1980-84, because of less farm 
export subsidies. Agriculture’s 8 percent share in 2004 contrasts with the 31 percent share for 
other primary products and the 25 percent for all other goods – a ‘thinness’ that is an 
important contributor to the volatility of international prices for weather-dependent farm 
products. If the policies distorting goods trade in 2004 were removed, the share of global 
production of farm products that is exported would rise from 8 to 13 percent, thereby 
reducing instability of prices and quantities of those products traded. 
Fourth, the developing countries’ share of the world’s primary agricultural exports 
rose from 43 to 55 percent, and its farm output share from 58 to 62 percent, because of those 
reforms, with rises in nearly all agricultural industries except rice and sugar. Removing 
remaining goods market distortions would boost their export and output shares to 64 and 65 
percent, respectively. 
Fifth, the average real price in international markets for agricultural and food products 
would have been 13 percent lower had policies not changed over the past quarter century. 
Evidently the impact of the RRA fall in high-income countries (including the cuts in farm 
export subsidies) in raising international food prices more than offset the opposite impact of 
the RRA rise (including the cuts in agricultural export taxes) in developing countries over 
that period. By contrast, removing remaining distortions as of 2004 is projected to raise the 
international price of agricultural and food products by less than 1 percent on average. This is 
contrary to earlier modeling results based on the GTAP protections database (e.g. Anderson, 
Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006) which estimated they would rise by 3.1 percent, or 
for just primary agriculture, by 5.5 percent). The lesser impact in these new results is because 
export taxes in developing countries based on the above NRA estimates are included in the 
new database (most notably for Argentina) whose removal would offset the international 
price-raising effect of eliminating import protection and farm subsidies elsewhere.  
Sixth, for developing countries as a group, net farm income (value added in 
agriculture) is estimated to be 4.9 percent higher than it would have been without the reforms 
of the past quarter century, which is more than ten times the proportional gain for non-
agriculture. If policies remaining in 2004 were removed, net farm incomes in developing 
countries would rise a further 5.6 percent, compared with just 1.9 percent for non-agricultural 
value added. As well, returns to unskilled workers in developing countries – the majority of 
whom work on farms – would rise more than returns to other productive factors from that 
liberalization. Together, these findings suggest both inequality and poverty could be   27 
alleviated by such reform, given that three-quarters of the world’s poor are in farm 
households in developing countries (Chen and Ravallion 2007).  
Finally, removal of agricultural price-supporting policies in high-income countries 
would undoubtedly lead to painful reductions in income and wealth for farmers there if they 
were not compensated – although it should be kept in mind that the majority of farm 
household income in high-income countries comes from off-farm sources (OECD 2008b). 
But the gainers in the rest of their societies could readily afford to compensate the losers from 
the benefits of freeing trade.  
 
 
Prospects for Further Reform 
 
 
It is not obvious how future policies might develop. A quick glance at the policy indicators 
could lead one to view developments from the early 1960s to the mid-1980s as an aberrant 
period of welfare-reducing policy divergence (negative and declining RRAs in low-income 
countries, positive and rising RRAs in most high-income countries) that has given way to 
welfare-improving and poverty-reducing reforms during which the two country groups’ 
RRAs are converging. But on inspection of the NRAs for exporting and import-competing 
sub-sectors of agriculture (figure 1.3), it is clear that the convergence of NRAs to near zero is 
mainly with respect to the exporting sub-sector, while NRAs for import-competing farmers 
are positive and trending upwards over time at the same rate in both developing and high-
income countries – notwithstanding the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture which 
was aimed at tariffying and reducing import protection. True, applied tariffs have been 
lowered or suspended as a way of dealing with the international food price spike in 2008, but 
this, and the food export taxes or quantitative restrictions imposed that year by numerous 
food-exporting developing countries, may be in place only until international prices return to 
trend (as happened after the price hike of 1973-74 and the price dip of 1986-87). 
The indications are very mixed as to why some countries appear to have reformed 
their price-distorting agricultural and trade policies more than others in recent decades, and 
why some have stubbornly resisted reform. Some reforming countries have acted unilaterally, 
apparently having become convinced that it is in their own national interest to do so. China is 
but the most dramatic and significant example of the past three decades among developing 
countries, while among the high-income countries only Australia and New Zealand categories   28 
are in that category. Others may have done so partly to secure bigger and better loans from 
international financial institutions and then, having taken that first step, they have continued 
the process, even if somewhat intermittently. India is one example, but there are numerous 
examples also in Africa and Latin America. Few have gone backwards in terms of increasing 
their anti-agricultural bias, but Zimbabwe and perhaps Argentina qualify during the present 
decade – and numerous others have joined them in 2008, at least temporarily, in response to 
the sudden upward spike in international food price. And some have reduced their 
agricultural subsidies and import barriers at least partly in response to the GATT’s 
multilateral Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, the European Union being the most 
important example (helped by its desire also for preferential trade agreements, including its 
recent expansion eastwards). 
  The EU reforms suggest agricultural protection growth can be slowed and even 
reversed if accompanied by re-instrumentation away from price supports to decoupled 
measures or more direct forms of farm income support. The starker examples of Australia 
and New Zealand show that one-off buyouts can bring faster and even complete reform.
18
Another indicator of agricultural trade reform reluctance is the unwillingness of many 
developing countries to agree to major cuts in bound agricultural tariffs in the WTO’s on-
going Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations. Indeed, many of them believe high-
income countries should commit to reducing their remaining farm tariffs and subsidies before 
developing countries should offer further reform commitments of their own. Yet modeling 
results reported in Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe and Anderson (2009) suggest that if 
 
But in the developing countries where levels of agricultural protection are generally below 
high-income levels, there are fewer signs of a slowdown of the upward trend in agricultural 
protection from import competition over the time period studied.  
Indeed, there are numerous signs that developing country governments want to keep 
open their options to raise agricultural NRAs in the future, particularly via import restrictions. 
One indicator is the high tariff bindings developing countries committed themselves to 
following the Uruguay Round: as of 2001, actual applied tariffs on agricultural products 
averaged less than half the corresponding bound tariffs for developing countries of 48 
percent, and less than one-sixth in the case of least-developed countries (Anderson and 
Martin 2006, Table 1.2).  
                                                 
18 For a detailed analysis of the buyout option versus the slower and less complete cashout option (moving to 
direct payments), as well as the uncompensated gradual squeeze-out or sudden cutout options, see Orden and 
Diaz-Bonilla (2006).   29 
high-income countries alone were to liberalize their agricultural markets, such a sub-global 
reform would provide less than two-thirds of the potential gains to developing countries that 
could come from global agricultural policy reform. 
More than that, the current negotiations have brought to prominence a new proposal 
for agricultural protectionism in developing countries. This is based on the notion that 
agricultural protection is helpful and needed for food security, livelihood security and rural 
development. This view has succeeded in bringing “Special Products” and a “Special 
Safeguard Mechanism” into the multilateral trading system’s agricultural negotiations, 
despite the fact that such policies, which would raise domestic food prices in developing 
countries, may worsen poverty and the food security of the poor (Ivanic and Martin 2008). 
To wait for high-income country reform before liberalizing the farm trade of 
developing countries is unwise as a poverty alleviating strategy, not least because the past 
history revealed in the NRAs summarized above suggests such reform will be at best slow in 
coming. In the US, for example, the most recent two five-year farm bills were a step 
backwards from the previous regime which at least sought to re-instrument protection 
towards less trade-distorting measures (Gardner 2009). Nor have the world’s large number of 
new regional integration agreements of recent years been very successful in reducing farm 
protection. Furthermore, for developing countries to postpone their own reform would be to 
forego a major opportunity to boost theirs and (given the size and growth in South-South 
trade of late) their neighbors’ economies. It would be doubly wasteful if, by being willing to 
commit to reform in that way, they would be able to convince high-income countries to 
reciprocate by signing on to a more-ambitious Doha agreement, the potential global benefits 
from which are very considerable.
19
Developing countries that continue to free up domestic markets and practice good 
macroeconomic governance will keep growing, and typically the growth will be more rapid 
in manufacturing and service activities than in agriculture, especially in the more densely 
populated countries where agricultural comparative advantage is likely to decline. Whether 
such economies become more dependent on imports of farm products depends, however, on 
what happens to their RRA. The first wave of Asian industrializers (Japan, and then Korea 
and Taiwan) chose to slow the growth of food import dependence by raising their NRA for 
  
                                                 
19 On the size of those potential net benefits compared with those from other opportunities that could address the 
world’s most important challenges as conceived by the Copenhagen Consensus project (whose expert panel 
ranked trade reform as having the second highest payoff among those dozens of opportunities), see 
www.copenhagenconsensus.org including the trade paper by Anderson and Winters (2008).   30 
agriculture even as they were bringing down their NRA for non-farm tradables, such that 
their RRA became increasingly above the neutral zero level. A key question is: will later 
industrializers follow suit, given the past close association of RRAs with rising per capita 
income and falling agricultural comparative advantage? Figure 1.9 suggests developing 
countries’ RRA trends of the past three decades have been on the same trajectory as the high-
income countries prior to the 1990s, so unless new forces affect their polities the 
governments of later industrializing economies may well follow suit. 
One new force is disciplines on farm subsidies and protection policies of WTO 
member countries following the Uruguay Round. Earlier industrializers were not bound under 
GATT to keep down their agricultural protection. Had there been strict discipline on farm 
trade measures at the time Japan and Korea joined GATT in 1955 and 1967, respectively, 
their NRAs may have been halted at less than 20 percent (figure 1.13). At the time of China’s 
accession to WTO in December 2001, its NRA was less than 5 percent according to this 
present study, or 7.3 percent for just import-competing agriculture. Its average bound import 
tariff commitment was about twice that (16 percent in 2005), but what matters most is 
China’s out-of-quota bindings on the items whose imports are restricted by tariff rate quotas. 
The latter tariff bindings as of 2005 were 65 percent for grains, 50 percent for sugar and 40 
percent for cotton (Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela 2008). Clearly the legal commitments 
even China made on acceding to WTO are a long way from current levels of support for its 
farmers, and so are unlikely to constrain the government very much in the next decade or so. 
And the legal constraints on developing countries that joined the WTO earlier are even less 
constraining. For India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, for example, their estimated NRAs for 
agricultural importables in 2000-04 are 34, 4 and 6 percent, respectively, whereas the average 
bound tariffs on their agricultural imports are 114, 96 and 189 percent, respectively (WTO, 
ITC and UNCTAD 2007). Also, like other developing countries, they have high bindings on 
product-specific domestic supports of 10 percent and another 10 percent for non-product 
specific assistance, a total of 20 more percentage points of NRA (17 percent in China’s case) 
that legally could come from domestic support measures – compared with currently 10 
percent in India and less than 3 percent in the rest of South Asia. 
Hopefully developing countries will choose not to make use of the legal wiggle room 
they have allowed themselves in their WTO bindings to follow Japan, Korea and Taiwan into 
high agricultural protection. A much more efficient and equitable strategy would be to instead 
treat agriculture in the same way they have been treating non-farm tradable sectors. That 
would involve opening the sector to international competition, and relying on more-efficient   31 
domestic policy measures for raising government revenue (e.g., income and consumption or 
value-added taxes) and for assisting farm families – including younger members seeking off-
farm employment – via public investment in rural education and health, rural infrastructure, 
and agricultural research (Otsuka and Yamano 2006; Otsuka, Estudillo and Sawada 2009). 
Historically developing countries’ expenditure on public agricultural research has amounted 
to the equivalent of less than 1 percent of the gross value of farm production (table 1.11), so it 
would not be difficult to double that level of investment with a diversion of just a small 
amount of the price support currently provided to farmers in those developing countries that 
provide farm import protection or input subsidies. 
As for high-income countries, the above distortion estimates show that they have all 
lowered the price supports for their farmers since the 1980s. In some countries that has been 
partly replaced by assistance that is at least somewhat decoupled from production. If that 
trend continues at the pace of the past quarter century, and if there is no growth of 
agricultural protection in developing countries, then before the middle of this century we may 
have removed most of the disarray in world food markets. However, if the WTO’s Doha 
Development Agenda collapses, and governments thereby find it more difficult to ward off 
agricultural protection lobbies, it is all the more likely that developing countries will follow 
the same agricultural protection path this century as that which was taken by high-income 
countries last century. One way to encourage developing countries to follow a more liberal 
policy path could be to extend the Integrated Framework’s Diagnostic Trade Integration 
Study (DTIS) process to a broader range of low-income countries. That process, which 
provides action plans for policy and institutional reform and lists investment and technical 
assistance needs, could be expanded to include the ‘aid for trade reform’ proposal that has 
been discussed in the context of the Doha round (Hoekman 2005) – regardless of the fate of 
the that round. 
 
 
Areas for Further Research 
 
 
The fact that the indications are mixed as to why some countries appear to have reformed 
more than others and some continue to resist reform, and that it is therefore unclear as to how   32 
policies might develop in the future, should not be surprising. After all, the long history of 
globalization is full of episodes of sensible policy reforms that for all sorts of reasons get 
reversed (Findlay and O’Rourke 2007, North, Wallis and Weingast 2006). To better 
understand what might happen in the context of continuing economic growth and terms of 
trade volatility, more in-depth analysis of the political economy of past policy behavior is 
warranted. That is now possible thanks to the new panel set of distortion estimates reported 
here, and some early findings from such analyses will appear in Anderson (2010). That 
collection includes a broad range of theoretical and econometric analyses aimed at better 
understanding the political economy forces that generated the evolving pattern of inter- and 
intra-sectoral distortions to farmer and food consumer incentives over recent decades.  
To contribute further to policy debate, a second area requiring further research 
economy-wide modeling of the impacts on agricultural markets, national economic welfare 
and income distribution of alternative policies. That is now easier to do well following the 
recent development of micro-simulation add-ons to such CGE models. How the reform of 
current policies – both own-country and rest-of world’s – impact on the extent of poverty and 
inequality are explored in a series of new country case studies in Anderson, Cockburn and 
Martin (2010), using global and national economy-wide models that are enhanced with 
detailed earning and spending information of numerous types of urban and rural households. 
The rest-of-world’s policy impact on each country’s terms of trade is informed by the 
project’s agricultural distortions database and generated using the same model as in this 
book’s final chapter (Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe and Anderson 2009). Hopefully other 
analysts will make use of the project’s agricultural distortions database to explore other 
policy scenarios, including a continuation of past agricultural protection growth for import-
competing farmers as an alternative counterfactual to further freeing of trade.  
And a third area for further research is in growth diagnostics. How much of the long-
term divergence in per capita incomes between current high-income countries on the one 
hand and developing and transition economies on the other can be explained by the long-term 
growth of agricultural NRAs and RRAs in the former? How much can be explained by the 
domestic market-insulating fluctuations in NRAs around those long-term assistance trends, 
which have contribute to the volatility of the terms of trade for agricultural-exporting 
countries? The recent work of Williamson (2008) offers one suggestion as to how such 
research might proceed. Finally, how much of the growth since the early 1980s in individual 
countries can be attributed to the reduction in distortions to agricultural incentives? Ravallion 
and Chen (2007) show that the decline in the anti-agricultural bias in farm price policies has   33 
contributed significantly to China’s poverty reduction. Rural growth has been shown to be a 
key contributor to the reduction in poverty in India too (Ravallion and Datt 1996). These 
types of studies can now be revisited using the more comprehensive set of measures of the 
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Figure 1.1: Gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers, over time and by 
region,
a
(a) over time 
 1955 to 2007 
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Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in the project’s 
national country studies.   40 
Figure 1.2: Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture,


















Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in the project’s 
national country studies. 
a. Includes non-covered products and non-product-specific (but not decoupled) assistance.   41 
Figure 1.3: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all covered 
agricultural products,
a
(a) Developing countries   
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Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in the project’s 
national country studies. 
a. Covered products only. The total also includes nontradables.    42 
Figure 1.4: Nominal rates of assistance, key covered products, high-income and developing 








































Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in the project’s 
national country studies. 
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Figure 1.5: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural tradable products 
and relative rate of assistance,
a
(a) Developing countries
 all focus countries, 1955 to 2004 
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Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in the project’s 
national country studies. 






b. Estimates for China pre-1981 and India pre-1965 are based on the assumption that the 
nominal rate of assistance to agriculture in those years was the same as the average NRA 
estimates for those countries for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively, and that the gross value 
of production in those missing years is that which gives the same average share of value of 
production in total world production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. 
 are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively.   45 
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 Asia, Africa and Latin America, 1965 to 
2004   







Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in the project’s 
national country studies. 
a. 5-year weighted averages with value of production at undistorted prices as weights. In 
Asia, estimates for China pre-1981 are based on the assumption that the nominal rate of 
assistance to agriculture and non-agricultural tadables and hence the RRA in those earlier 
years were the same as the average NRA estimates for China in 1981-89.   46 
































































































Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in the project’s 
national country studies. 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively   48 
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HIC RRA obs HIC fitted values
DC RRA obs DC fitted values
 all focus countries, 






  Coefficient  Standard error  R
2 
DCs  0.26   0.02  0.17 
HICs  0.28  0.03  0.14 
 
Source: Author’s derivation with country fixed effects, using data in Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008) that are based on RRA estimates reported in the project’s national 
country studies. 
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Figure 1.10: Relationship between RRA and the trade bias index for agriculture, focus 
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Source: Author’s derivation using data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) that are based on 
NRA and RRA estimates reported in the project’s national country studies   50 
Figure 1.11: Welfare Reduction Indexes for covered tradable farm products, by region, 1960 
to 2007  
(percent) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).   51 
 




Source: Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009b). 
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Source:  Based on estimates in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008)   53 
Table 1.1: Key economic and trade indicators of focus countries, by region, 2000–04  
  Share (%) of world:  National relative to world (world=100)  Agric trade 
special-ization 
index  
b  Pop’n 
 





 per capita 
RCA,
a  
agric & food 
Africa 
11.71  1.67  6.04  12.87  14  148  na 
na 
Asia 
50.76  10.37  36.65  72.46  20  34  80  -0.03 
Latin America 
8.33  5.33  7.73  3.20  64  171  na  
na 
Europe and Central Asia 
7.43  3.60  6.39  3.30  48  178  na  
na 
Western Europe 
6.31  28.66  15.43  0.56  454  46  106  -0.03 
United States and Canada 
5.14  32.67  10.82  0.25  636  186  119  0.08 
Australia and New Zealand 
0.38  1.54  1.57  0.05  405  2454  354  0.62 
Japan 
2.05  12.51  4.94  0.19  610  5  12  -0.84 
All focus countries 
87.83  94.94  89.57  89.75 
na  na  na  na 
Other (non-focus) developing  
  and transition economies  12.17  5.06  10.43  10.25 
na  na  na  na 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2007), compiled mainly from World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
a. Revealed comparative advantage index is the share of agriculture and processed food in national exports as a ratio of that sector’s share of 
global exports.  
b. Primary agricultural trade specialization index is net exports as a ratio of the sum of exports and imports of agricultural and processed food 
products (world average =0.0).   54 
 
Table 1.2: Poverty in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe’s transition economies, 1981 to 
2005 
(on less than $1/day) 
 
  1981  1993  2005  Share of 
poor (%) 
who are 
rural, 2002  
No. of people (million):         
Sub-Saharan Africa  157  247  299  69 
East Asia and Pacific  948  600  180  85 
    of which China  730  444  106  90 
South Asia  387  341  350  75 
    of which India  296  280  267  74 
Latin America and Caribbean  27  34  28  34 
European transition economies  3  10  16  50 
WORLD  1528  1237  879  74 
 Asia’s share of world  87  76  60   
         
% of population         
Sub-Saharan Africa  40  44  39   
East Asia and Pacific  69  36  10   
    of which China  74  38  8   
South Asia  42  29  24   
    of which India  42  31  24   
Latin America and Caribbean  7  7  5   
European transition economies  1  2  3   
WORLD  42  27  16   
 
Source: Chen and Ravallion (2008) and, for rural share, Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula 
(2007).   55 
Table 1.3: Growth of real GDP and exports, focus countries, 1980 to 2004 
 
(at constant 2000 prices, percent per year, trend-based) 
 






Africa  na  na  na  na  na  na 
Asia  3.1  8.6  7.5  7.1  5.5  11.2 
Latin America  na  na  na  5.4  3.6  7.2 














Western Europe  0.8  1.4  2.6  2.3  2.0  5.5 
United States and 
Canada  2.7  2.6  3.4  3.2  2.0  6.7 
Australia and New 
Zealand  2.8  2.5  3.6  3.3  2.0  6.5 
Japan  -1.7  2.0  3.0  2.5  2.1  4.0 
All focus countries             
World  2.0  2.5  3.2  3.0  1.4  6.1 
 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2007), compiled from World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators.   56 
Table 1.4: Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture,
a focus countries, 1955 to 2007
  
c 
 (percent)  
1955-59  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Africa  -14  -8  -11  -15  -13  -8  -1  -9  -6  -7  na 
Asia  -27  -27  -25  -25  -24  -21  -9  -2  8  12  na 
Latin America  -11  -8  -7  -21  -18  -13  -11  4  6  5  na 
Europe and Central Asia na 
b  na  na  na  na  na  na  10  18  18  25 
Western Europe  44  57  68  46  56  74  82  64  44  37  18 
United States and Canada  13  11  11  7  7  13  19  16  11  17  11 
Australia and New Zealand  6  7  10  8  8  11  9  4  3  1  2 
Japan  39  46  50  47  67  72  119  116  120  120  81 
                       
Developing countries  -26  -23  -22  -24  -22  -18  -8  -2  6  9  na 
High-income countries  
22  29  35  25  32  41  53  46  35  32 
17 
 
All focus countries (wted. average):  3  5  6  0  2  5  17  18  17  18  na 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in the project’s national country studies. 
a. Weighted average for each country, including non-product specific assistance as well as authors’ guesstimates for non-covered farm products 
(but not decoupled assistance), with weights based on gross value of agricultural production at undistorted prices. Estimates for China pre-1981 
and India pre-1965 are based on the assumption that the nominal rate of assistance to agriculture in those years was the same as the average 
NRA estimates for those countries for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively, and that the gross value of production in those missing years is that 
which gives the same average share of value of production in total world production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. 
Developing country and world aggregates are computed accordingly.  
b ECA countries are not included in the high-income or developing country aggregates.  57 
Table 1.5: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural exportables, import-competing 
products, and the trade bias index,
a
 
























Africa                       
NRA agric. exportables  na  -30.1  -38.4  -42.6  -42.6  -35.0  -36.7  -35.8  -26.1  -24.6  na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  18.6  11.8  1.9  14.5  13.2  58.3  5.2  9.8  1.6  na 
Trade Bias Index  na  -0.41  -0.45  -0.44  -0.50  -0.43  -0.60  -0.39  -0.33  -0.26  na 
Latin America                       
NRA agric. exportables  na  -20.4  -12.8  -27.0  -25.2  -27.1  -25.0  -10.5  -3.5  -4.6  na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  26.3  8.7  -2.8  1.1  13.6  5.1  19.4  12.5  20.6  na 
Trade Bias Index  na  -0.37  -0.20  -0.25  -0.26  -0.36  -0.29  -0.25  -0.14  -0.21  na 
South Asia  
c                     
NRA agric. exportables  na  -37.5  -37.2  -30.0  -36.1  -27.9  -20.6  -15.8  -12.0  -6.2  na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  39.2  41.2  39.4  45.1  37.9  63.3  25.1  14.5  26.5  na 
Trade Bias Index  na  -0.55  -0.56  -0.50  -0.56  -0.48  -0.51  -0.33  -0.23  -0.26  na 
China and Southeast Asia  
c                     
NRA agric. exportables  na  -55.5  -55.1  -51.8  -50.1  -50.0  -41.0  -20.8  -2.2  0.1  na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  -10.3  -8.9  -9.4  -2.6  0.5  15.1  3.3  13.3  12.3  na 
Trade Bias Index  na  -0.50  -0.51  -0.47  -0.49  -0.50  -0.49  -0.23  -0.14  -0.11  na 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan                       
NRA agric. exp  -18.1  5.7  4.3  15.4  10.3  25.1  48.9  57.1  57.0  70.3  na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  35.6  43.3  52.8  54.1  76.6  83.7  124.9  127.4  127.0  134.6  122.6 
Trade Bias Index  -0.40  -0.26  -0.32  -0.25  -0.38  -0.32  -0.34  -0.31  -0.31  -0.27  na 
European transition econs.                       
NRA agric. exportables  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  -3.2  -1.0  -1.0  15.2 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  32.5  35.4  35.7  32.3 
Trade Bias Index  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  -0.27  -0.27  -0.27  -0.13 
Western Europe                       
NRA agric. exp  9.3  17.4  31.7  22.5  33.3  31.1  50.1  38.0  15.0  8.1  1.7 
NRA agric. imp-comp  59.4  77.2  82.9  55.7  61.7  79.5  87.6  67.2  52.8  50.5  28.9 
Trade Bias Index  -0.31  -0.34  -0.28  -0.21  -0.18  -0.27  -0.20  -0.17  -0.25  -0.28  -0.21 
North America                       
NRA agric. exportables  2.7  2.8  6.1  5.1  2.9  5.4  10.5  6.0  5.4  7.6  4.1 
NRA agric. imp-comp  8.6  9.3  8.8  6.7  10.5  19.7  23.6  18.6  11.3  16.8  11.0 
Trade Bias Index  -0.05  -0.06  -0.02  -0.01  -0.07  -0.11  -0.10  -0.10  -0.05  -0.08  -0.06 
ANZ                       
NRA agric. exportables  3.8  4.7  6.6  5.8  5.5  7.6  6.5  3.6  2.2  0.2  0.2 
NRA agric. imp-comp  7.9  8.3  9.3  11.7  8.7  8.4  6.5  3.8  2.0  2.0  1.5 
Trade Bias Index -0.04 
   -0.03  -0.02  -0.05  -0.03  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.02  -0.01 
Developing countries
NRA agric. exportables 
c 
na  -46.5  -44.6  -45.4  -43.9  -41.4  -35.8  -18.7  -5.5  -3.0  na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  12.7  13.5  7.8  12.8  16.5  37.7  22.6  22.0  23.0  na 
Trade Bias Index na 
   -0.53  -0.51  -0.49  -0.50  -0.50  -0.53  -0.34  -0.23  -0.21  na 
High-income countries  
NRA agric. exportables  4.2  7.4  13.5  10.3  11.3  12.1  22.3  15.9  8.1  6.9  2.9 
NRA agric. imp-comp  31.2  45.9  50.2  36.5  47.4  58.1  71.4  62.4  53.9  50.7  30.8 
Trade Bias Index -0.21 
   -0.26  -0.24  -0.19  -0.24  -0.29  -0.29  -0.29  -0.30  -0.29  -0.21 
World 
NRA agric. exportables 
c 
na  -23  -20  -23  -25  -24  -17  -7  -1  0  na 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  35  37  27  34  38  57  43  38  36  na 
Trade Bias Index   na  -0.43  -0.42  -0.39  -0.44  -0.45  -0.47  -0.35  -0.28  -0.26  na 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in the project’s 
national country studies. 
a. NRAs for non-covered products are included here (unlike in Figure 1.3).  
b. Trade Bias Index, TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagx 
and NRAagm are the weighted average percentage NRAs for the exportable and 
import-competing parts of the agricultural sector, with weights based on production   58 
valued at undistorted prices. TBIs shown here are calculated using the regional 5-year 
averages of  NRAagx and NRAagm
c. Estimates for China pre-1981 and India pre-1965 are based on the assumption that 
the nominal rate of assistance to agriculture in those years was the same as the 
average NRA estimates for those countries for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively, 
and that the gross value of production in those missing years is that which gives the 
same average share of value of production in total world production in 1981-84 and 
1965-69, respectively. The developing country and world averages are computed 
accordingly.  
. 
   59 
Table 1.6: Dispersion of nominal rates of assistance across covered agricultural products,
a
  
 focus regions, 1965 to 2007
 
(percent)  
1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Africa  31  30  37  36  36  31  25  25  na 
Asia  56  42  49  53  66  56  57  64  na 
Latin America  49  44  52  52  44  42  32  40  na 
Europe and Central Asia  34  33  41  26  39  56  39  45  44 
Western Europe  119  85  112  98  122  86  69  74  64 
United States and Canada  29  15  31  62  71  39  31  37  28 
Australia and New Zealand  40  45  26  17  20  14  12  7  5 
Japan  69  82  156  143  175  162  136  143  116 
All focus countries (wted. average)  54  45  55  51  59  53  43  48  na 
Product coverage  68 
b  70  71  73  73  72  71  68  70 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in the project’s national country studies. 
a. Dispersion for each region is a simple average of the country-level annual standard deviations around a weighted mean of NRAs per country 
across covered products each year. 
b. Share of gross value of total agricultural production at undistorted prices accounted for by covered products.   60 
Table 1.7: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural 
industries, 1955 to 2007  
 (percent, weighted averages)  




1955-59  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04 
Covered products -33.4 
a  -29.6  -28.8  -30.2  -27.6  -23.3  -13.2  -4.9  3.8  6.7 
Non-covered products  -9.0  -7.9  -7.6  -9.8  -9.8  -7.1  0.3  0.1  3.9  6.3 
All agricultural 
products -27.1 
a  -24.0  -23.1  -24.9  -23.1  -19.1  -9.8  -3.5  3.9  6.6 
Total agricultural 
NRA (incl. NPS) -25.8 
b  -22.7  -21.8  -23.7  -22.0  -17.8  -8.3  -1.8  5.7  8.7 
Decoupled assistance  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.3 
Total agric. NRA 
(incl. NPS + decoup)  -25.8  -22.7  -21.8  -23.7  -22.0  -17.8  -8.3  -1.6  5.9  9.0 
Assistance to just tradables: 
   All ag tradables -27.9 
b  -25.4  -25.3  -28.2  -25.7  -20.9  -10.3  -2.2  6.2  8.9 
   Non-ag tradables  56.9  43.1  45.0  30.6  27.3  18.8  14.0  12.7  9.0  5.7 
Relative rate of 
assistance, RRA -54.1 
d  -47.7  -48.4  -44.9  -41.6  -32.9  -21.2  -13.1  -2.5  3.1 
 
























Covered products 22.0 
a  30.9  37.0  27.2  34.2  38.9  55.6  43.2  32.0  28.7  16.6 
Non-covered products  10.0  14.6  14.9  11.5  14.1  13.7  21.1  17.0  17.0  16.7  91.9 
All agricultural 
products 18.5 
a  26.2  30.7  22.8  28.6  31.8  45.6  35.6  27.5  25.0  12.6 
Total agricultural 
NRA (incl. NPS) 22.3 
b  28.8  32.4  23.7  30.2  36.3  49.6  40.0  31.3  29.4  16.5 
Decoupled assistance  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6  4.7  5.8  5.5  8.1  9.6  9.9 
Total agric. NRA 
(incl. NPS + decoup)  22.3  28.8  32.4  23.7  30.8  41.0  55.4  45.5  39.4  39.0  26.4 
Assistance to just tradables: 
   All ag tradables 23.0 
b  30.2  34.2  25.0  32.2  37.9  52.0  41.7  32.5  30.1  17.0 
   Non-ag tradables  7.5  8.7  9.1  6.3  4.5  3.8  3.7  2.5  2.1  1.8  -0.2 
Relative rate of 
assistance, RRA 14.3 
d  19.7  23.0  17.6  26.5  32.8  46.6  38.2  29.8  27.8  17.2 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in the project’s 
national country studies. 
b. NRAs including non-product-specific (NPS) assistance, that is, the assistance to all primary 
factors and intermediate inputs as a percentage of the total primary agricultural production 
valued at undistorted prices. 
c. Trade Bias Index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and 
NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the import-competing and exportable parts of 
the agricultural sector. The regional average TBI is calculated from the regional averages of 
the NRAs for exportable and import-competing parts of the agricultural sector.  






e. Estimates for the NRA and RRA for China pre-1981 and India pre-1965 are based on the 
assumption that the agricultural NRAs in those years were the same as the average NRA 
estimates for those countries for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively, and that the value of 
production in those missing years is that which gives the same average share of value of 
 are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively.    61 
production in total world production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. Developing 
country and world aggregates are computed accordingly.    62 




























Africa                       
NRA agric.   na  -13.3  -19.6  -25.0  -22.1  -13.5  -0.3  -15.4  -8.7  -12.0  na 
NRA non-agric.  na  3.7  2.7  1.5  5.7  1.6  9.2  2.7  2.0  7.3  na 
RRA  na  -15.2  -21.4  -26.0  -25.9  -13.1  -8.3  -17.1  -10.4  -18.0  na 
Latin America                       
NRA agric.   na  -11.4  -9.3  -23.0  -19.0  -12.9  -11.2  4.4  5.5  4.9  na 
NRA non-agric.  na  26.9  31.3  27.8  23.3  18.5  16.8  7.3  6.6  5.4  na 
RRA  na  -30.2  -30.9  -39.8  -34.2  -26.6  -24.0  -2.7  -1.0  -0.5  na 
South Asia  
b                     
NRA agric.   na  4.1  4.4  9.7  -7.7  1.8  47.1  0.2  -2.4  12.7  na 
NRA non-agric.  na  114.4  117.8  81.7  57.8  54.6  39.9  18.6  15.0  10.1  na 
RRA  na  -51.5  -51.9  -39.8  -41.6  -33.3  5.1  -15.5  -14.9  3.4  na 
China and Southeast Asia  
b                     
NRA agric.   na  -43.6  -42.6  -40.1  -35.7  -34.5  -27.8  -12.0  4.9  7.1  na 
NRA non-agric.  na  36.5  36.5  33.7  30.8  20.6  23.3  19.8  9.6  5.5  na 
RRA  na  -58.7  -58.0  -55.2  -50.8  -43.4  -41.6  -26.4  -4.2  1.5  na 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan                       
NRA agric.   30.1  39.9  48.8  51.3  75.5  78.8  124.3  129.9  130.5  138.1  126.1 
NRA non-agric.  8.6  8.3  6.1  4.2  3.5  2.4  2.5  1.4  1.1  0.6  1.0 
RRA  19.7  29.1  40.2  44.9  69.6  74.6  118.7  126.7  128.1  136.7  123.7 
European transition econs.                       
NRA agric.   na  na  na  na  na  na  na  10.0  18.3  16.1  17.0 
NRA non-agric.  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  9.8  5.5  4.6  2.7 
RRA  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  0.1  12.2  11.0  13.9 
Western Europe                       
NRA agric.   43.8  57.0  67.5  45.7  56.3  74.4  82.0  63.4  43.6  36.8  18.5 
NRA non-agric.  8.0  7.2  5.7  3.8  2.5  1.5  1.7  1.3  1.5  1.4  1.2 
RRA  33.1  46.5  58.6  40.4  52.6  71.9  79.0  61.3  41.5  34.9  17.1 
North America                       
NRA agric.   12.5  10.5  10.9  7.5  7.6  13.8  20.2  16.1  11.4  17.3  11.2 
NRA non-agric.  6.1  7.4  7.4  5.5  4.1  3.8  3.7  3.3  2.1  1.5  1.3 
RRA  6.0  2.9  3.3  1.8  3.4  9.7  15.8  12.4  9.1  15.5  9.7 
ANZ 
NRA agric.   5.5  6.6  8.3  7.9  7.3  10.6  8.7  4.3  2.9  1.0  0.6 
NRA non-agric.  20.0  21.5  24.0  19.7  14.3  13.5  10.3  6.4  3.4  2.4  2.4 
RRA  -12.1  -12.2  -12.6  -9.9  -6.1  -2.6  -1.5  -2.0  -0.5  -1.4  -1.8 
Developing countries
NRA agric.  
b 
na  -24.0  -27.3  -31.9  -25.5  -21.0  -15.6  -3.9  4.0  7.4  na 
NRA non-agric.  na  58.3  60.0  45.8  37.3  34.6  27.0  16.7  9.8  6.3  na 
RRA  na  -52.0  -54.5  -53.3  -45.8  -41.3  -33.6  -17.6  -5.3  1.1  na 
High-income countries  
NRA agric.   23.0  30.9  36.8  26.5  34.7  43.0  55.5  48.2  36.6  33.9  18.3 
NRA non-agric.  7.5  8.5  7.7  5.4  3.6  3.4  3.2  2.5  1.7  1.3  -0.7 
RRA  14.3  20.6  27.1  19.9  30.1  38.3  50.6  44.6  34.3  32.1  19.2 
World
NRA agric.  
b 
na  5.6  7.6  0.8  2.6  5.7  18.7  19.7  18.4  18.6  na 
NRA non-agric.  na  19.0  20.5  16.1  13.7  10.0  9.8  7.6  6.0  4.0  na 
RRA  na  -11.3  -10.7  -13.2  -9.8  -3.6  8.1  11.3  11.8  14.0  na 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in the project’s 
national country studies. 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively.   63 
b. Estimates for the RRA for China pre-1981 and India pre-1965 are based on the 
assumption that the agricultural NRAs in those years were the same as the average 
NRA estimates for those countries for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively, and that the 
value of production in those missing years is that which gives the same average share 
of value of production in total world production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. 
Developing and world country aggregates are computed accordingly.   64 
Table 1.9: Gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers, total and per farm worker, by region, 1965 to 2007 
 
(a) Total (constant 2000 US$ billion per year) 
   1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Africa  -5  -9  -11  -6  -1  -7  -5  -6  na 
Asia  -69  -110  -126  -106  -38  -8  38  57  na 
Latin America  -2  -13  -13  -14  -10  4  5  4  na 
Europe and Central Asia -3 
 a  -1  -2  -10  1  4  19  19  26 
Western Europe  89  76  124  133  123  117  76  55  34 
United States and Canada  19  16  19  31  36  30  20  30  32 
Australia and New Zealand  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  0 
Japan  16  18  37  33  53  59  53  42  22 
All focus countries  46  -21  30  64  165  201  208  202  na 
     Developing countries  -79  -133  -152  -136  -48  -6  58  75  na 
     High-income countries (HICs)  125  112  182  199  214  207  150  127  80 
     HICs including decoupled (HIC)
125 
b 
112  186  223 
238 
  235  193  173  130 
WORLD (scaled) 51 
c  -24  34  70  192  225  233  223  na 
   65 
Table 1.9 (continued): Gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers, total and per farm worker, by region, 1965 to 2007 
 
(b) Per person engaged in agriculture (constant 2000 US$ per year) 
 
   1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Africa  -77  -137  -142  -81  -10  -69  -44  -46  na 
Asia  -114  -166  -174  -136  -45  -9  41  60  na 
Latin America  -79  -410  -408  -407  -305  132  177  143  na 
Europe and Central Asia  -123  -54  -101  -443  45  141  541  569  888 
Western Europe  4259  4433  8163  10097  10889  12397  9617  8427  5141 
United States and Canada  3733  3436  4189  6730  8220  7478  5582  9182  8763 
Australia and New Zealand  3504  3452  3492  4744  3226  1613  1221  442  1061 
Japan  1301  1845  4830  5432  10234  13957  16234  16933  12469 
All focus countries  59  -27  34  66  164  185  181  172  na 
     Developing countries  -116  -177  -185  -154  -51  -6  53  67  na 
     High-income countries (HICs)  3261  3491  6483  8166  9972  11325  9745  9871  7180 
     HICs including decoupled 3261 
a  3491  6625  9151  11091  12857  12539  13447  11681 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in the project’s national country studies. 
a. ECA data are only Turkey until 1991. Farmer numbers are from FAOSTAT which may differ from national statistics. Estimates for the NRA 
and RRA for China pre-1981 and India pre-1965 are based on the assumption that the agricultural NRAs in those years were the same as the 
average NRA estimates for those countries for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively, and that the value of production in those missing years is that 
which gives the same average share of value of production in total world production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. Developing country 
and world aggregates are computed accordingly.  
b. Decoupled payments to farmers are excluded from all rows except the final two. 
c. Assumes the NRA in non-focus countries is the same as the average for the focus countries in each region (including decoupled payments in 
the case of other high-income countries), and that their share of the value of regional agricultural production at undistorted prices is the same as 
their average share of the region’s agricultural GDP at distorted prices during 1990-2004. For the countries of North Africa (other than Egypt) 
and the Middle East, their NRAs are assumed to be the same as Turkey’s.   66 
Table 1.10: Consumer tax equivalents of policies assisting producers of covered farm 




   1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Africa  -12  -16  -9  -6  16  -8  0  -3  na 
Asia  -12  -15  -2  -15  -14  -3  5  10  na 
Latin America  -7  -18  -13  -12  -10  13  6  8  na 
Europe and Central 
Asia -17 
b  -6  -7  -28  1  -2  9  17  12 
Western Europe  74  49  59  70  65  49  37  32  17 
United States and 
Canada  8  6  7  13  10  2  -5  -2  2 
Australia and New 
Zealand  15  11  10  10  10  8  4  2  1 
Japan  67  68  93  99  135  119  116  107  81 
                   
Developing 
countries  -12  -16  -5  -14  -10  0  5  8  na 
High-income 
countries  42  30  40  45  50  41  32  27  16 
All focus countries  23  14  21  10  15  16  15  16  na 
 
(b)Per capita (constant 2000 US$ per year) 
 
   1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Africa  -15  -27  -16  -12  21  -10  0  -3  na 
Asia  -6  -13  -2  -22  -18  -4  6  10  na 
Latin America  -4  -24  -22  -31  -16  34  11  12  na 
Europe and Central 
Asia -20 
b  -9  -9  -41  1  -13  15  30  20 
Western Europe  240  202  306  276  247  207  138  103  50 
United States and 
Canada  40  35  43  67  42  8  -18  -9  11 
Australia and New 
Zealand  112  87  80  68  56  49  22  12  8 
Japan  130  157  287  258  435  498  443  344  221 
                   
Developing 
countries  -7  -15  -5  -22  -13  -1  6  8  na 
High-income 
countries  153  136  207  195  199  176  124  94  59 
All focus countries  30  18  39  23  27  29  26  23  na 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in the project’s 
national country studies. 
a. ECA data are only for Turkey until 1991.   67 
Table 1.11: Intensity of public agricultural R&D investment, high-income and developing 
country regions, 1971 to 2004 
 
(expenditure as percent of gross value of agric production at undistorted prices) 
 
  1970s  1980s  1990s  2000-04 
All high-income countries  2.2  2.2  1.9  1.6 
All developing countries  0.4  0.6  0.75  0.9 
     Asia  0.3  0.6  0.7  0.9 
     Latin America  0.2  0.4  0.45  0.6 
     Sub-Saharan Africa  1.2  1.1  1.2  1.1 
 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on R&D data from the CGIAR’s Agricultural 
Science and Technology Indicators website at www.asti.cgiar.org   
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Appendix Table 1.A: Export orientation, import dependence and self-sufficiency in primary 
agricultural production, focus countries
a
 
, 1961 to 2004 
 
(percent at undistorted prices) 
 
 (a) Exports as share of production 
 
1961-64  1970-74  1980-84  1990-94  2000-04 
Africa  19  17  12  7  8 
Asia  5  4  4  6  5 
Latin America  24  27  16  16  27 
Western Europe  13  16  27  37  43 
United States and Canada  14  14  20  20  21 
Australia and New Zealand  41  35  44  43  48 
Japan  1  2  1  0  1 
All focus countries  11  11  13  16  16 
Developing countries  8  8  7  8  8 
High-income countries  14  15  22  26  29 
 
(b) Imports as share of apparent consumption 
 
  1961-64  1970-74  1980-84  1990-94  2000-04 
Africa  2  2  5  4  4 
Asia  4  4  8  16  14 
Latin America  2  4  7  10  17 
Western Europe  32  28  34  41  46 
United States and Canada  4  4  5  9  12 
Australia and New Zealand  3  2  3  5  6 
Japan  23  24  24  26  27 
All focus countries  11  10  12  19  18 
Developing countries  3  4  8  14  13 
High-income countries  18  16  20  25  27 
 
 (c) Self-sufficiency ratio 
 
  1961-64  1970-74  1980-84  1990-94  2000-04 
Africa  120  117  107  104  105 
Asia  102  100  96  89  91 
Latin America  129  132  110  107  114 
Western Europe  78  85  90  94  94 
United States and Canada  111  112  119  114  111 
Australia and New Zealand  165  151  174  170  183 
Japan  78  78  77  74  74 
All focus countries  100  101  101  96  98 
Developing countries  105  104  99  93  95 
High-income countries  96  98  103  101  102 
 
Source: Compiled using the project’s estimates of total agricultural production valued at 
undistorted prices and the FAO’s total agricultural trade value data, in Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008). 
 
a Includes intra-EU trade. Not included are Iceland, ECA, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, 
Togo. 
 